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IP as Conflict Resolution:
A Micro View of IP

SOLVEIG SINGLETON*

If one pokes at free speech rights with a sharp analytical and historical
stick, he or she may be surprised by how much free speech rights depend
on and are defined by property rights.1 My right to deliver a political
speech does not mean that I have a right to break into your house and
deliver it in your living room. Free speech rights have boundaries, and
property rights often decide where these boundaries are. (Some of the
harder free speech cases involve cases where property boundaries are
blurred, for example, in public forums or on the public airwaves.) In any
case, one does not hear much about the potential conflict between
trespass law and free speech, but one does hear concerns about a conflict
between intellectual property (IP) and free speech. This is the problem
that Richard Epstein’s paper entitled Liberty versus Property: Understanding
the Foundations of Copyright Law addresses.2
* Adjunct Senior Fellow, Progress and Freedom Foundation. J.D., Cornell Law
School; B.A., Reed College. This Article is based on a paper originally presented at the
June 2003 conference, Promoting Markets in Creativity: Copyright in the Internet Age,
in Washington, D.C. The conference was organized by the Progress & Freedom
Foundation and the National Center for Technology and Law at the George Mason
University School of Law.
1. See generally John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision
of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49 (1996) (describing the historic origin of
free speech rights in property rights). See also Solveig Singleton, Reviving a First
Amendment Absolutism for the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 313–15 (1999)
(discussing property issues implicated in Hugo Black’s First Amendment doctrine).
2. Richard Epstein, Liberty versus Property: Cracks in the Foundations of
Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 3 (2005) (“[T]his Article . . . is an examination of
the tension between liberty and property within the natural law tradition of Locke . . . .
[It also examines] how the same tension between liberty and property plays out in
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The question is whether the difference between IP and physical
property is such that we must be concerned about a conflict between free
speech and IP in a way we need not be concerned about a conflict
between free speech and trespass. Professor Epstein’s answer is that IP
is different from physical property, but not that different.3 Both IP and
physical property rules exist because they are useful in channeling
incentives. There will, however, be differences in how particular conflicts
between liberty and property ought to be resolved, depending on the
nature of the tangible or intangible resource, some of which Professor
Epstein explores.4 This Article defends Professor Epstein’s basic argument,
that IP and physical property are essentially linked, and further explores
how the linkage relates to some obvious differences between the legal
regimes for tangible and intangible property.
I. THE ROOTS OF PHYSICAL PROPERTY: PRACTICAL
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
When analyzing physical property, Professor Epstein starts from the
premise that there is no self-evident or a priori justification for the
institution.5 At several points in the argument we need to go back to
utilitarian arguments, thinking about the kinds of rules and incentives
needed to encourage the creation of new wealth. Another thread in his
argument is that we need rules that make sense as a system of resource
allocation, in the sense of providing a useful answer to the question of
who is entitled to what.6

connection with copyright . . . .”) [hereinafter Epstein, Liberty versus Property].
3. Id. at 4 (“In the end, it is largely proper to yoke together liberty and
property . . . .”); see also id.:
[T]he gulf between property rights in tangibles and property rights in
intangibles is far narrower than these theorists believe. The set of justifications
used in the former carries over to the latter. The only question that remains is
how the differences in the nature of the resources in question, whether copyright or
patent . . . require a distinctive configuration of property rights in the appropriate
area. . . . Intellectual property rights rest on some plausible but not infallible
assumptions, but so too do property rights in land and water.
4. Id. at 25–26.
5. See id. at 5–6; see also id. at 28 (“[M]y own private campaign has been to
insist that the strength of the natural law theories rested on their implicit utilitarian
(broadly conceived) foundations, which require some empirical evaluation of why given
institutions promote human flourishing and through it general social welfare.”).
6. See id. at 7 (“[I]f I do not deserve the fruits of my labor . . . then who
does? . . . . [C]ritics leave completely undetermined just who should get the benefit of
all the elements that are thought in combination to be insufficient to justify a claim on
desert . . . .”); see also id. at 9 (“[T]he effort to isolate proportionate contributions from
luck and from effort falls apart because of the inability to conduct sensible measurements
over countless individuals for countless periods.”).
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This latter thread about the need for rules to serve as a practicable
basis for resource allocation turns out to be tremendously important; it
ties in directly to the day-to-day function of property rules in conflict
resolution. Historically, it was doubtful that there was a Philosopher
King (or Economist King) looking down on property rights from above
and saying: “We need property rights to create incentives.” If we stay
tuned into what we know about the history of property law, the rules
evolved in case-by-case deliberations.7 In individual cases, it is the
micro-focus emphasis on conflict resolution that dominates, i.e., individuals
involved in resolving conflicts over actual pieces of property. On a dayto-day basis, authorities (such as they were) would have been largely
concerned with what happens when A snatched an apple out of B’s hand
and B clobbered A over the head with a stick.8 And this thread of
conflict resolution turns out to be important in IP, too, as discussed
further below.
In discussing physical property, Professor Epstein is right to set aside
idealistic considerations of whether the owners of property deserve their
right in it.9 This will strike a lot of people as counter-intuitive, as divorcing
ethics and justice too far. Nevertheless, it is right. The economist F.A.
Hayek explains why we cannot worry about establishing perfect fairness
or individual merit when it comes to making law.10 First, we need a
system of rules that rewards results, not intentions. This planet can be a
harsh environment for human beings. We need to produce food and
7. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 7–8 (Beacon Press 1963)
(1861) (describing how judgments preceded legislators or even principles in ancient law).
8. This view of the evolution of law is recognized today in game theoretic
discussions of how legal principles may have evolved in individual encounters. See, e.g.,
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). See generally Robert
Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095 (1986);
Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms, Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?,
96 J. PHIL. 588 (1999); Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson, An Economist’s Perspective
on the Evolution of Norms, 150 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 45 (1994);
Peter Vanderschraaf, Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325
(2000).
9. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 5–7.
10. F.A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE 72 (1976):
[T]o hold out a sufficient incentive for those movements which are required to
maintain a market order, it will often be necessary that the return of people’s
effort do not correspond to recognizable merit . . . . It is not good intentions or
needs but doing what in fact most benefits others, irrespective of motive,
which will secure the best reward.
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shelter and other goods, and so we want to reward those who actually
produce those goods, whether they do so by luck or something else.
Second, this planet, and human life on it, is inherently unfair by a pure
egalitarian standard. Some are born into good families, some into bad,
some into rich lands, and some into poor. To eradicate this unfairness
would require a level of totalitarian control over human life that would
put to shame anything attempted by the former Soviet Union.11 Law is
good at giving us rough and ready rules for when A hits B with a club,
but it cannot establish perfection.
II. IP AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In moving on to discuss intellectual property, Professor Epstein notes
that the process of making IP is statutory and therefore it is top-down,12
not bottom-up “found law” in the sense that common law or other law
built on cases or customs is.13 But the result is defensible for similar
reasons—because it is needed to make us all better off by putting in
place incentives to create. I agree with this argument.
However, notice that the earlier concern about practical conflict
resolution has fallen out of the debate. Returning to this concern and
thinking about IP and the needs of a system of conflict resolution, we
again stumble across a difference between IP and physical property. The
threat of a breach of the peace that one gets if one grabs an apple out of
someone’s hand is simply not as immediate if one copies some Macintosh
software and leaves him with his own copy, especially if one does so
over a wire, remote from him in time and space. Therefore, the argument
about incentives is roughly the same for physical property and IP at the
macro level, but the problem of conflict resolution is different at the
micro level—not a difference of kind, but of degree.
This helps explain why many ordinary people—college students and
Grokster fans of all stripes—just feel differently about IP than they do
about stealing physical property. And the law recognizes this difference
as well in the penalties for copyright. Historically, policing costs have
been borne by the copyright owner, not by the publicly funded police
and prosecutors brought to bear against more obvious and immediately
dangerous breaches of the peace. Penalties for copyright were mostly
civil, with criminal violations much less emphasized.14
11. Id. at 84–85 (“To achieve [real equality of opportunity] this government would
have to control the whole physical and human environment of all persons . . . .”).
12. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 20.
13. BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 11, 21–22 (3d ed. 1991).
14. See generally Note, The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the
Digital Era, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
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It should be noted that this difference in the way IP functions as
conflict resolution is a difference of degree, not of kind. It is so because
there is a danger that IP will ultimately result in breaches of the peace as
wasteful as people hitting each other over the head with clubs. Things
could get nasty, with viruses embedded in MP3 files and endless wars
between hackers and coders; though this might yield a flood of
innovation, this is far from clear, some of the resources thus expended
might be better directed elsewhere. Therefore, it is important to return to
a consensus on ground rules here.
However, it is easier said than done—it is not likely that many
ordinary people will suddenly start worrying in the abstract about
incentives. One attempt to get people to think about copyright the way they
do about theft has been through deterrence by increasing the penalties
for copyright infringement, introducing more criminal penalties, and so
on.15 This is probably a mistake for two reasons. First, empirical research
on deterrence shows that it has more to do with the frequency of
enforcement than the severity of penalties. A law that is enforced only
in a few token cases with severe penalties is a much less effective
deterrent than a law with a light penalty that is consistently enforced.16
Consequently, the direction that should be followed is towards more
consistent enforcement, not higher penalties.
Second, increasing penalties for copyright infringement to the point
where college students are threatened with being tossed into prison for
several years will strike most people as grossly unfair. And it will only
further undermine the consensus in favor of copyright.

15. Id.
16. Empirical evidence shows that increasingly severe punishment is a less
effective deterrent than increasing the probability the violator will be caught. See
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (6th
ed. 1995); Ann Dryden Witte, Economic Theories, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 316, 322 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). Studies of individual level tax
compliance have also found that the severity of the penalty is less of a deterrent than the
probability of detection. Dick J. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the
Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 291, 291–92 (Joel
Slemrod ed., 1992); see also Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting
Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra, at 95, 107, 113. These studies suggest that
the weight of a sanction only becomes relevant after the likelihood of being caught
becomes substantial.
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III. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF POSITIVISM WITH EXPECTATIONS:
IP AND PHYSICAL PROPERTY
Professor Epstein shows that ordinary physical property and IP are
basically useful man-made creatures.17 This leads us to a problem that
Professor Epstein has discussed at length elsewhere.18 If these rules are
made by man, why can’t they be broken and remade by man? That is, if
we show that IP is like physical property and vice versa using utilitarian
arguments, haven’t we just shown that legislatures, as today’s spokespersons
for society, can remake them at will? Wouldn’t this be especially true
for IP, which Professor Epstein points out has a more obviously topdown component than physical property?19
I think not. To explain why not, I will attempt a sports analogy. Consider
a game of basketball. Halfway through the game the referees or some other
authority decide to move the basket a few inches higher, or to the left, or
to change the application of some other rule to the game. Both the players
and the fans would likely be furious and baffled. It does not matter to
them where the rules came from, or whether or not the rules could
originally have been different in some respect. What matters is that their
expectations—their plans and practices—have settled around the rules
they were originally given. If the rules are changed, it should only be for
a very good reason.
For IP, or basketball, or physical property, what the ground rules are
matters because people’s expectations matter. We count on rules to
make our uncertain future as human beings a little less uncertain. Even
with top-down statutory rules, what ultimately matters about the rules is
the role they play in people’s lives.
Therefore, with IP, as with physical property or with a game of
basketball, we can have a meaningful conversation about fairness when
the rules are interpreted differently or changed.20 Italian legal scholar
Bruno Leoni, another big advocate of bottom-up rules and legal certainty,
thought that at bottom our sense of what is fair and right stem from well-

17. See generally Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2.
18. Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 157 (2003) [hereinafter Epstein, Dubious
Constitutionality].
19. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 20.
20. Note that this argument is not intended to supply or supplant the much more
specific constitutional inquiries and tests that are brought to bear in considering whether
any particular law or practice is unconstitutional; one must have something more specific
to base such determinations on than general expectations. The argument about
expectations is simply intended to explain how man-made rules, top-down or bottom-up,
acquire normative force even if they originally included some arbitrary element.
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established expectations, which he referred to as “previsions.”21
But here again we stumble across another interesting bit of history that
has recently split IP and physical property apart on the surface. Technology
has made IP increasingly hard to enforce and easy to break, and the
practice of routine copying has confused people’s expectations of what
is fair and right. Once expectations get off on the wrong foot, it can
be dreadfully difficult to get them back on the right track again. One
almost has to start at the beginning all over again and hope for some
kind of “constitutional moment.” This is probably what needs to happen
for IP. But it will not be a smooth process, and the name calling we
have seen so far in the debate will not help.
IV. WHAT IS THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?
Let us explore one final implication of this emphasis on micro conflict
resolution for the issue of the conflict between copyright and liberty.
Suppose the legislature changes the copyright law, for example, by
extending the length of already existing copyrights for a period of years.
Professor Epstein has argued that this is a First Amendment violation,22
just as the change to the boundaries of physical property law by regulation
would constitute a taking. The theory is that one cannot give to some
without taking from others. In the case of IP, the possession of others is
the public domain. In his paper, Professor Epstein invokes public trust
law, and notes that the state ought to be reimbursed for intrusions on the
public trust.23 Do we want to treat the public domain as a public trust?
But I think that treating the public domain as a possession of others is
also a pretty dubious proposition. Professor Epstein’s own point that
property must function as a practical system of resource allocation, and
that too many competing claims prevent this, is relevant here. In a
Lockean tradition, we do not want to be arguing that when someone
takes a handful of nuts from the commons, the nuts were, prior to the
taking, owned in some sense by everyone. It is much cleaner and causes
fewer problems (and I think is more historically realistic) to treat the
nuts as being owned by no one. One might ask if it does not make a
great deal of sense to treat the public domain in copyright the same
21. LEONI, supra note 13, at 198.
22. Epstein, Dubious Constitutionality, supra note 18, at 157.
23. Epstein, Liberty versus Property, supra note 2, at 27–28; see also Epstein,
Dubious Constitutionality, supra note 18, at 156–58.
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way—not as information owned by everyone, but as information owned
by no one. Treating it as property owned by everyone just does not
seem to make for a sensible system of conflict resolution—there are too
many potentially competing claims.
One counter-argument might be that the First Amendment boosts
information up into something like property owned by everyone. But I
do not think we want it to be treated like a public trust administered by
the state. If the last survivor of a key battle is hit by a truck on the way to
talk to a historian, should the state sue the truck driver for the resulting
loss to the public trust? Probably not.
Therefore, I do not think we need to treat the public domain as anything
like common property to throw up a red flag when the legislature messes
with it. But this is simply because ordinary people’s expectations matter,
the way they matter in the basketball example above.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Epstein is correct in that both physical property and IP are
about incentives, though they have different origins (as far as we know).
Here are some differences in the way the two systems function as
systems of conflict resolution, but those are differences of degree and
technology, not differences as to their fundamental nature.
So it does not make much more sense to speak of a conflict between
free speech and IP at a fundamental level, than of a conflict between free
speech and the law of trespass, if you toss a would-be speaker out of
your living room or edit a column in your newspaper. There can be
conflicts between IP legislation and the First Amendment, just as there
can be conflicts between property law or regulation and the Takings
Clause. Once the rules are in place, people should be able to rely on
them as a practical matter so fundamental that it becomes normative.
In practice, our expectations about IP enforcement at the micro level
have become divorced from the theory that justifies IP as a system of
incentives at the macro level. Those notions have to be two sides of the
same coin, as they tend to be with physical property, or they will cause
conflict rather than resolve it. This problem desperately needs to be
resolved with IP, and the name calling that we have seen so far in the
debate will not resolve it. What we need is a new appreciation of why
incentive systems matter. Perhaps this conclusion is too theoretical for
the average downloading college student, but if so, we are going to have
bigger problems than just the erosion of IP. We might be looking at the
erosion of property rights across the board. If some of the college
campus rhetoric about globalism, environmentalism, trade, and other
similar issues is any guide, that is just what we are seeing.
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